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Recent work has shown how to use the laws of quantum mechanics to keep classical
and quantum bits secret in a number of different circumstances. Among the examples are
private quantum channels, quantum secret sharing and quantum data hiding. In this paper
we show that a method for keeping two classical bits hidden in any such scenario can be
used to construct a method for keeping one quantum bit hidden, and vice–versa. In the
realm of quantum data hiding, this allows us to construct bipartite and multipartite hiding
schemes for qubits from the previously known constructions for hiding bits. Our method
also gives a simple proof that two bits of shared randomness are required to construct a
private quantum channel hiding one qubit.
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Dedication to David Mermin
It is a pleasure to have an opportunity to include our work in this tribute to our friend David Mermin.
We hope that he will enjoy it, as it is a brand new result flowing from the teleportation/dense coding
mindset that has been so fantastically productive in quantum information theory over the past few years.
As the now-admitted midwife of teleportation, he will recognize the usual elements (the ensemble of Pauli
rotations, the one-qubit-gets-you-two-bits-and-vice-versa structure) of these kinds of arguments, twisted
though they may be in the service of some new cryptographic application. It seems that the metamorphosis of
the teleportation game of 1993 into a myriad of different serious constructions in the service of cryptography,
secure and fault tolerant computation, and communication complexity has not yet come to an end. We are
grateful to David Mermin for helping set this process in motion, and for continuing to observe the resulting
flowering with a generous, interested, and critical eye.
I. INTRODUCTION
Work in recent years has shown how to use the laws of quantum mechanics to keep classi-
cal and quantum bits secret in a number of different circumstances. In some scenarios, the bits
are kept secret from an eavesdropper while in others, they are kept secret from the participants
themselves. Perhaps the simplest such example is the quantum generalization of the one-time
pad, known as a private quantum channel [1, 2]. In this setting, two parties make use of shared
random bits to create a secure quantum channel between them. In this case, the message is kept
secret from an eavesdropper with access to the output of the quantum channel. In contrast, the
goal in quantum secret sharing [3] is to share a secret, in the form of classical or quantum bits, be-
tween many parties. Certain prescribed combinations of the parties, known as authorized sets, are
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2capable of fully reconstructing the secret using quantum communication while the other unau-
thorized combinations of parties can learn nothing at all about the secret, even if they act jointly
on their shares. A third example, which will be the focus of this paper, is known as quantum data
hiding. This task, introduced in Refs. [4, 5] for the bipartite setting and generalized to multiple
parties in Ref. [6], imposes a stronger security criterion than quantum secret sharing. Whereas
in quantum secret sharing an authorized set may be able to extract information about the secret
by performing local operations in addition to classical communication, in quantum data hiding
the authorized set needs to communicate quantum data in order to get substantive information
about the secret. So in quantum data hiding one allows all parties to communicate classical data
to one another in an effort to reveal the secret. Quantum communication within an unauthorized
set, supplemented with classical communication between all parties, reveals nothing. (Or, rather,
next to nothing; one of the results of Ref. [5] is that perfect quantum data hiding is impossible.)
The main result of this paper is the first construction of quantum data hiding protocols for
hiding qubits; the protocols of Refs. [5] and [6] only work for hiding classical bits. Our method
is to build on top of the earlier work, converting any method for hiding 2n bits into a method for
hiding n qubits. For symmetry, wewill also demonstrate how any n-qubit data hiding scheme can
be converted into a 2n-bit hiding scheme. The connection, which is closely related to the duality
between superdense coding [7] and teleportation [8], is largely independent of the setting of the
problem. Indeed, the basic idea, as sketched in Fig. 1, can actually be applied just as well to the
private quantum channel and quantum secret sharing as to quantum data hiding.
We begin section II by defining bipartite data hiding and describing the method for converting
between bit and qubit hiding schemes. In sections IIA and II B we provide security proofs for the
resulting schemes under the idealized assumption that the original schemes were perfectly secure
before relaxing to approximate hiding in sections IIC and IID. The additional complications that
arise in multipartite hiding are dealt with in section III, where our main result is that the only
constraints on the authorized sets are the same as those for quantum secret sharing [9]. Section
IV demonstrates how the duality imposes limits on the resources required for hiding. As an
application, we provide a simple, conceptual proof that 2n bits of shared key are required for an
n-qubit private quantum channel.
As the reader has probably already noticed, the term quantum data hiding refers to the methods
used rather than the data stored. Rather than resorting to contorted phrases like ‘quantum hiding
of quantum data’, we will henceforth omit the first ‘quantum’ and refer to qubit-hiding schemes or
bit-hiding schemes. Hopefully, this will simultaneously keep both confusion and redundancy to a
minimum. In this paperwewill denote the density operator corresponding to a pure state |ϕ〉 asϕ.
The phrase ‘Trace-preserving Completely Positive map’ will be abbreviated to ‘TCP map’. A TCP
map that can be implemented by Local Operations supplemented by Classical Communication is
called an LOCC map or operation. The trace norm ||A||1 of an operator A is defined as ||A||1 =
Tr
√
A†A.
II. BIPARTITE HIDING
Formalizing the description of data hiding used in the introduction, we define an n-bit data
hiding scheme for two parties Alice (A) and Bob (B) to consist simply of a set of orthogonal bipar-
tite hiding states {ρABI }, where I = i1i2 . . . in is an n-bit string. Since these states are orthogonal,
we can define a physical encoding map Ec(|I〉〈I|) = ρI . The orthogonality condition guarantees
that, if allowed quantum communication, Alice and Bob can perfectly recover I by some decoding
operations D. The scheme is said to be perfectly secure if Alice and Bob are incapable of learning
anything using only LOCC operations. Equivalently, the scheme is perfectly secure if, for all I , J
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FIG. 1: Conversion between classical and quantum hiding schemes: A. Using the classical hiding scheme Ec
via teleportation to get a quantum hiding scheme. B. Using the quantum hiding scheme Eq via superdense
coding to get a classical hiding scheme. Double lines denote classical data and solid lines multi-qubit
quantum data. The gate σ applies a (tensor product) of Pauli operations as a controlled unitary. Bell M
denotes a Bell measurement [8]. Note that in the ’teleportation’ circuit in A, the corrective Pauli operations
are omitted.
and LOCC operations L,
TrAL(ρI) = TrAL(ρJ). (1)
As noted in the introduction, this perfect security is not actually possible. We say that the scheme
is ǫ-secure if, for all I , J and LOCC operations L,
‖TrAL(ρI)− TrAL(ρJ)‖1 < ǫ. (2)
If ǫ = 0 this definition reduces to perfect security.
Extending this approach to the case of quantum data, we say that a bipartite n-qubit hiding
scheme consists of an encoding map Eq taking n-qubit states ϕ to bipartite hiding states Eq(ϕ) on
AB such that there exists a TCP decoding map D satisfying D(Eq(ϕ)) = ϕ for all ϕ. The scheme
is δ-secure if for all ϕ0 and ϕ1 as well as LOCC operations L,
‖TrAL(Eq(ϕ0))− TrAL(Eq(ϕ1))‖1 < δ. (3)
Henceforth we will restrict our attention to pure state inputs ϕ0 and ϕ1. This is sufficient because
the convexity of the trace norm ensures that the most distinguishable states will always be pure.
For the rest of the paper, we will also impose the additional requirement that the map Eq cor-
respond to a physical operation, meaning that it will be TCP. For the qubit-hiding schemes we
construct, the condition will be satisfied automatically. When we attempt to construct bit hiding
schemes from qubit-hiding schemes however, our method would fail without the extra condition.
Now we are ready to explain how to construct secure hiding schemes for sets of n qubits
starting from secure hiding schemes for 2n classical bits.
Assumewe have a classical hiding scheme for 2n bits with encoding mapEc. The hiding states
are ρI , where I = i1i2 · · · in is a string of length n, each position taking an integer value between 0
4and 3. Let ϕ be an n-qubit state. We define a TCP encoding map Eq by
Eq(ϕ) =
1
22n
∑
I
Ec(|I〉〈I|)AB1 ⊗ σIϕσB2I =
1
22n
∑
I
ρAB1I ⊗ σIϕσB2I , (4)
where σI = σi1 ⊗ σi2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σin is a tensor product of Pauli operators, adopting the convention
that σ0 = I. It is clear that if ρI are a set of orthogonal states, there exists a decoding operation
D such that D ◦ Eq(ϕ) = ϕ. Notice that Bob’s register is divided into two parts, the first storing
his half of the bit-hiding states ρI and the second a Pauli-conjugated version of ϕ. Equivalently, a
more operational way of thinking about Eq(ϕ) is as the output of the circuit illustrated in Fig. 1A.
Using a dual construction, any perfectly secure n-qubit hiding scheme can be used to build a
perfectly secure 2n-bit hiding scheme. Let Eq be some TCP encoding map, not necessarily of the
form of Eq. (4), hiding states of an n qubit registerB1 on a bipartite systemAB1. (We will assume
without loss of generality when discussing this ‘superdense coding scheme’ that the initial state
is stored on Bob’s system.) Our method of hiding 2n classical bits combines the quantum hiding
scheme and superdense coding, see Fig. 1B. Let
|ΦI〉B1B2 = (σI ⊗ IB2)|Φ〉B1B2 , (5)
where |Φ〉B1B2 = 2−n/2∑2nk=1 |k〉B1 |k〉B2 is a maximally entangled state between the registers B1
and B2. We define the hiding states for the classical bits to be
ρI = (Eq ⊗ IB2)(ΦB1B2I ). (6)
Since Eq is a qubit-hiding scheme there exists a decoding operation D such that D ◦ Eq = I. This
implies that the classical hiding states ρI are orthogonal since they can be mapped by an operation
D ⊗ I onto the orthogonal states ΦI .
In the next few sections we will prove the security of a qubit hiding scheme from the security
of the bit-hiding scheme and vice-versa.
A. Perfect Hiding: Classical → Quantum
Our goal is to show that if the ρI are perfectly secure 2n-bit hiding states then the states Eq(ϕ),
defined in Eq. (4), are, likewise, perfectly secure n-qubit hiding states. By construction, some
simple-minded approaches to cheating by Alice and Bobwill fail to yield any information aboutϕ.
First, because the reduced state on theB2 register is always maximally mixed, nomeasurement by
Bob onB2 alone will yield any information about the input state. Similarly, since theAB1 register
starts independent of ϕ, any LOCC protocol applied to it alone will have output independent of
ϕ. Moreover, since the ρI form a set of perfect hiding states, Bob’s final reduced density operator
on B1 will be independent of I so he can’t learn anything that would help him to undo the I-
dependent Pauli rotations on B2. This doesn’t prove security, however. It is conceivable that by
acting on B1 and B2 together in an LOCC protocol that Bob might be able cheat by a strategy we
haven’t yet considered. We now give a formal proof that this is not possible.
Suppose, on the contrary, that the proposed n-qubit hiding scheme is not secure against arbi-
trary LOCC cheating. That is, there is a choice of input states ϕ0 and ϕ1 and an LOCC operation
L such that
TrAL(Eq(ϕ0)) 6= TrAL(Eq(ϕ1)). (7)
In words, Bob’s output density operator at the end of the LOCC protocol depends on the input
state, meaning that he can perform a local measurement that will distinguish to some degree
5between inputs ϕ0 and ϕ1. Our goal in what follows will be to prove that if this were true, the ρI
could not be perfect hiding states.
For convenience, we’ll adopt the more compact notation L = TrA ◦ L. We can then introduce
the operations
LI(τB2) = L(ρAB1I ⊗ τB2) (8)
which represent the action of the LOCC operation L given a particular value of the hiding state
ρI . Note that LI , while it is TCP, is not necessarily itself an LOCC operation because it involves the
preparation of a potentially entangled ancilla ρAB1I . We can then write
L(Eq(ϕ)) = 1
22n
∑
I
LI(σIϕσI) (9)
for the output of the ’cheating’ operation on an n-qubit hiding state. From this identity, we can
conclude that not all the LI are identical to L0, however; if they were, then by linearity,
L(Eq(ϕ)) = L0
(
1
22n
∑
I
σIϕσI
)
= L0
(
1
2n
IB2
)
(10)
would be independent of the input state ϕ, violating Eq. (7).
The non-constancy of theLI can then be converted into amethod for breaking the 2n-bit hiding
scheme. Supplied with a state ρAB1I from which they would like to learn about I , Alice and Bob
implement the following LOCC protocol. First, Bob prepares a maximally entangled state
|Φ〉B2B3 = 1√
2n
2n∑
k=1
|k〉B2 |k〉B3 (11)
between two local registers B2 and B3. Alice and Bob then together apply the LOCC operation
L ⊗ IB3 to the state ρAB1I ⊗ ΦB2B3 , resulting in the outcome (LI ⊗ IB3)(Φ) on Bob’s system alone.
By the Jamiołkowski isomorphism between operations and states [10], the non-constancy of the
LI implies that the outcome cannot be independent of I . Hence, Bob can perform a local measure-
ment whose outcome will be I-dependent and the 2n bit hiding scheme based on the ρI cannot
be secure.
B. Perfect Hiding: Quantum → Classical
Consider the definition of the bit-hiding states in Eq. (6). Because we can choose an operator
basis consisting of density operators τJ , there is an expansion
|Φ〉〈Φ|B1B2 =
∑
JK
αJKτJ ⊗ τK (12)
of the projector for the maximally entangled state in terms of density operators for product states.
(The αJK , of course, will not all be positive.)
Now let’s try cheating on our 2n-bit hiding scheme. If L = TrA ◦L is again an LOCC operation
with output on Bob’s system, then substituting Eq. (12) into (6) shows that
L(ρI) = L((Eq ⊗ IB2)(ΦB1B2I ))
=
∑
JK
αJKL(Eq(σIτJσI)AB1 ⊗ τB2K ). (13)
6The operation of first preparing τK on B2 and then applying L is itself LOCC so by the perfect
security of the n-qubit hiding scheme, we can conclude that L(Eq(σIτJσI)AB1 ⊗ τB2K ) is indepen-
dent of σIτJσI for all I and J . Consequently, L(ρI) is independent of I , meaning that the 2n-bit
hiding scheme is perfectly secure.
C. Imperfect Hiding: Classical → Quantum
As was shown in Ref. [5], while a bit-hiding scheme can be made ǫ-secure for all ǫ > 0, perfect
security is not possible. So, we need to investigate whether a nearly secure bit-hiding scheme
leads to a nearly secure qubit-hiding scheme. We show that an ǫ-secure 2n-bit hiding scheme can
be converted into a δ-secure n-qubit hiding scheme, for δ = ǫ2n+1. The exponential factor 2n+1,
while undesirable, needn’t cause practical difficulties: for the bit-hiding schemes presented in
Refs. [5] and [6], ǫ decreases exponentially with the size of the hiding state. Therefore, the factor
2n+1 can be suppressed at a cost of increasing the size of the hiding state by a factor polynomial
in n. Furthermore, it could very well be that the estimates we present here are not tight and that
the factor is only an artifact of our analysis. In any case, the idea behind the proof of security is
the same as in the perfect case but the details, unfortunately, become significantly more technical.
So as not to repeat ourselves, we will adopt the notation of section IIA.
In the perfect case, we proceeded by making a connection between the behavior of L ◦Eq and
(LI ⊗ IB3)(ΦB2B3). Name this last operator ωI and introduce ∆I = ωI − ω0. Recall also that the
encoding operation Eq takes B2, an n-qubit system, to AB1B2 while the LOCC L takes AB1B2 to
a Bob-only system. Since we don’t want to make any assumptions yet about it’s structure, we will
call this system Bf . We define the state
ξBfB3 = ((L ◦ Eq)⊗ IB3) (ΦB2B3). (14)
The state ξ can be related to the action of the map L ◦Eq on a state ϕ by the identity
ϕ = 2nTr2((I⊗ ϕ∗)Φ12), (15)
where ϕ∗ is the complex conjugate of the density matrix of ϕ and the numbers 1 and 2 are general
system labels. Now, as in the perfect hiding case, assume that the n-qubit hiding scheme is not
δ-secure, meaning that there exist states ϕ0 and ϕ1 such that
δ < ‖(L ◦Eq)(ϕ0)− (L ◦Eq)(ϕ1)‖1. (16)
Using the identity in Eq. (15) and the definition of ξ, we find that
δ < 2n‖TrB3(I⊗ ϕ∗0)ξBfB3 − TrB3(I⊗ ϕ∗1)ξBfB3‖1. (17)
In order to relate δ to∆I , we rewrite ξ in the following manner:
ξBfB3 = ((L ◦ Eq)⊗ IB3) ΦB2B3
=
1
22n
∑
I
(LI ⊗ IB3)
(
(σI ⊗ IB3)ΦB2B3(σI ⊗ IB3)
)
=
1
22n
∑
I
(IBf ⊗ σI)ωI(IBf ⊗ σI)
= TrB3ω0 ⊗
1
2n
IB3 +
1
22n
∑
I
(IBf ⊗ σI)∆I(IBf ⊗ σI), (18)
7where we have used the fact that (I ⊗ σI)|Φ〉 = ±(σI ⊗ I)|Φ〉. When inserting this in Eq. (17) we
observe that the term involving TrB3ω0 ⊗ 12n IB3 makes no contribution so we need only keep the
sum over (I⊗ σI)∆I(I⊗ σI). In the following derivation we will need the inequality
||PA||1 ≤ ||A||1, (19)
where P is a projector. This can be proved as follows. Let λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . be the singular values of
A. Let P be a k-dimensional projector. We have
||PA||1 = max
U
Tr(PAU) ≤ max
U,Q
Tr(QAU) =
k∑
i=1
λi ≤ ||A||1, (20)
where we used that Q is k-dimensional projector.
We insert the result of Eq. (18) in Eq. (17) and apply Eq. (19), the monotonicity under partial
trace and subadditivity of the trace norm to find
δ <
1
2n
∑
I
‖(I⊗ ϕ∗0)(I⊗ σI)∆I(I⊗ σI)‖1
+
1
2n
∑
I
‖(I⊗ ϕ∗1)(I⊗ σI)∆I(I⊗ σI)‖1
≤ 1
2n−1
∑
I
‖(I⊗ σI)∆I(I⊗ σI)‖1
=
1
2n−1
∑
I
‖∆I‖1 . (21)
Reading this inequality as an average over the 22n possible values of I , there must exist a partic-
ular choice for I for which ‖ωI − ωI=0‖1 = ‖∆I‖1 > δ/2n+1. As in the perfect hiding argument,
this provides a cheating operation for the classical scheme that will distinguish the hiding states
of the particular I and I = 0. The classical scheme, therefore, cannot be δ/2n+1-secure.
D. Imperfect Hiding: Quantum → Classical
We suppose that there is some quantum hiding scheme Eq that is δ-secure, i.e. for all pairs of
quantum states ϕ0 and ϕ1 and LOCC operations Lwe have
‖(L ◦ Eq)(ϕ0)− (L ◦ Eq)(ϕ1)‖1 ≤ δ. (22)
¿From this we will deduce the quality of the derived bit-hiding scheme, that is, we study
‖L(ρI)− L(ρJ)‖1, (23)
where ρI and ρJ are given in Eq. (6). We will use an explicit operator expansion of the maximally
entangled projector Eq. (12) [5, Eq. (24)]:
Φ =
1
4n
4n−1∑
M=0
(−1)N(11)σM ⊗ σM . (24)
Here N(11) counts the number of σy operators in the product σM . Note also that σM , for anyM ,
has 2n−1 positive eigenvalues (λ = +1), and the same number of negative eigenvalues ( λ = −1);
therefore, it can be written as the difference of two density operators using
σM = 2
n−1(ρM+ − ρM− ), (25)
8where ρM± are separable. In the following, we will use the shorthand σIMI = σIσMσI , and ρ
IMI
± =
σIρ
M
± σI . With all this, we can write for Eq. (23):
‖L(ρI)− L(ρJ)‖1 = ‖L((Eq ⊗ IB2)(|ΦI〉〈ΦI | − |ΦJ〉〈ΦJ |))‖1
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 14n
∑
M
(−1)N(11)[L(Eq(σIMI)⊗ σM )− L(Eq(σJMJ)⊗ σM )]
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 1
4n
∑
M
‖L(Eq(σIMI)⊗ σM )‖1 + ‖L(Eq(σJMJ)⊗ σM )‖1
≤ 2
4n
max
K
∑
M
‖L(Eq(σKMK)⊗ σM )‖1
≤ 2 · 2
2(n−1)
4n
max
K
∑
M
∥∥L(Eq(ρKMK+ )⊗ ρM+ )− L(Eq(ρKMK− )⊗ ρM+ )+
L(Eq(ρKMK− )⊗ ρM− )− L(Eq(ρKMK+ )⊗ ρM− )
∥∥
1
≤ 1
2
max
K
∑
M
∥∥L(Eq(ρKMK+ )⊗ ρM+ )−L(Eq(ρKMK− )⊗ ρM+ )∥∥1 +
1
2
max
K
∑
M
∥∥L(Eq(ρKMK− )⊗ ρM− )− L(Eq(ρKMK+ )⊗ ρM− )∥∥1
≤ 4
n
2
max
K
max
M
∥∥L(Eq(ρKMK+ )⊗ ρM+ )− L(Eq(ρKMK− )⊗ ρM+ )∥∥1 +
4n
2
max
K
max
M
∥∥L(Eq(ρKMK− )⊗ ρM− )− L(Eq(ρKMK+ )⊗ ρM− )∥∥1
≤ 4
n
2
(2δ) = 4n δ. (26)
In the last inequality, we used the fact that ρM± are separable density matrices, independent of K ,
which implies that Alice and Bob can prepare them by LOCC operations. Thus to distinguish,
say, Eq(ρ
KMK
+ ) ⊗ ρM+ from Eq(ρKMK− ) ⊗ ρM+ by LOCC should not be easier then to distinguish
Eq(ρ
KMK
+ ) from Eq(ρ
KMK
− ) by LOCC, for which the distinguishability is bounded as in Eq. (22).
So, we get a bound on the quality of the bit-hiding scheme, although one suffering the same
exponential deficiency as the bound of section IIC.
III. MULTIPARTY HIDING & QUANTUM SECRET SHARING
We now consider the task of hiding quantum data in a multiparty setting. Generalizations
of bipartite bit-hiding schemes to multipartite situations have been developed by Eggeling and
Werner [6]. Unfortunately, there is a problem with combining these bit-hiding schemes with the
qubit-hiding construction of Eq. (4): the qubit-hiding scheme places the hidden quantum state
entirely in the possession of a single party since register B2 belongs to Bob. In the direct general-
ization of the scheme to the multiparty setting, the privileged holder of the hidden quantum state
would, therefore, necessarily have to be a member of every authorized set. This would eliminate
the possibility of threshold schemes, for example, in which any sufficiently large subset of the
parties should be able reconstruct the secret. The solution is to hide distributed quantum data,
using quantum error correcting codes to share the hidden quantum state between the parties in a
more symmetrical fashion.
An application involving such distributed hiding has been considered in the literature: quan-
tum secret sharing [3]. In quantum secret sharing, the identity of a distributed quantum state,
9held by a set of parties, is unobtainable by these parties if they do only local operations. There
are authorized sets of parties who, with quantum communication among each other, can recon-
struct (i.e., put the full state in the possession of any single party) the quantum state, and there are
unauthorized sets, for whom no reconstruction is possible even with quantum communication.
Such quantum secret sharing schemes are implementable with quantum error correcting codes;
for example, there is a five-qubit error correcting code for which any three out of the five parties
constitute an authorized set, while any set of two is unauthorized. With such error correction
codes, quantum secret sharing schemes with any “access structure” are realizable. This access
structure need only be consistent with monotonicity and the quantum no-cloning theorem, mean-
ing that any superset of an authorized set is authorized, and the complement of an authorized set
is unauthorized [9].
The capabilities of quantum secret sharing can be strengthened by the techniques of this pa-
per. The quantum secret sharing protocol does not specify the status of the secret if the parties
can perform LOCC operations, rather than just local operations. In fact, for the implementation
of quantum secret sharing using quantum error correcting codes, LOCC operations between the
parties can, and often do, result in the parties obtaining partial information about the secret. How-
ever, by wrapping the quantum state of quantum secret sharing inside a multipartite version of
our qubit-hiding protocol, we can guarantee that the quantum secret is impervious to attack by
LOCC operations of the parties; we illustrate the idea in Fig. 2. This requires some generalization
of the protocol given above, and of its security analysis.
FIG. 2: If five parties each have shares of a state in a five-qubit error correcting code, then the identity of
the state cannot be obtained by two parties in quantum communication [9]. But if all parties are in addition
in classical communication with one another (dotted lines), then the parties can obtain some information
about the state. If, however, the secret-sharing state is encoded using a bit-hiding state holding 2 × 5 bits
(Eq. (27)), then the parties can obtain only a negligible amount of information about the hidden quantum
state.
Suppose we have a p-party quantum secret sharing state ϕ, and that k qubits distributed
among these parties are sufficient to hold this state. (For quantum secret sharing schemes, k
is polynomially related to the number of logical qubits n that can be hidden in such a state,
k = poly(n, p).) Now, we can create a new state with stronger security properties using the map
E(ϕ) =
1
22k
∑
I
ρ1I ⊗ (σIϕσI)2 (27)
10
Here the quantum secret lives in subsystem “2”, which is an k-qubit multipartite Hilbert space
distributed among the p partiesHA2 ⊗HB2 ⊗HC2 ⊗ .... The dimensions of these local spaces need
not be the same, since some parties may get larger shares of the secret than others. Each party also
has a register of subsystem “1”, comprising s qubits in total, which contains the data hiding state
ρI , and which is capable of hiding the 2k-bit string I . Note that, although the secret-sharing state
ϕ may only occupy a subspace of the “2” subsystem (as when it is a quantum error correcting
code state), σI acts on the entire “2” Hilbert space, not just on the code subspace in which the
quantum secret may be contained.
As Eggeling and Werner have recently shown, there exist multipartite data-hiding states ρI
with any desired access structure, and with hiding security that is exponential in s/k [6]. (Unlike
the bipartite states used in Ref. [5], however, these states are not orthogonal, just nearly so. This
gives rise to a small probability of error when authorized sets reconstruct the secret but otherwise
has no effect on the analysis for our purposes.) If we choose the access structure of the ρI states
and the ϕ quantum secret sharing states to be identical, then the quantum state can obviously still
be reconstructed by quantum communication within an authorized set; first ρI is measured to
identify I , then the Pauli rotation σI is done by the authorized parties, so that they have the state
ϕ “in the clear”, permitting them to reconstruct it by whatever operations the original quantum
secret sharing protocol prescribed. Of course, it does not matter whether the Pauli rotations are
done by the parties outside the authorized set, since these parts of the quantum state ϕ are not
needed for the reconstruction anyway.
In the rest of this section, we demonstrate the other part of the desired security of the protocol:
an unauthorized set cannot reveal the quantum state even when all parties can perform LOCC
and quantum communication can be performed within the unauthorized set. The proof relies on
the fact, as in the bipartite case, that with these resources, the parties cannot decode the classical
hiding states ρI .
So, we suppose that in the given “unauthorized” setting, the 2k-bit hiding scheme is ǫ-secure;
we will show that the quantum-state hiding is guaranteed to be δ-secure, for δ = ǫ23k+5. The first
part of the demonstration closely follows the reasoning of Section IIC. We consider “cheating”
operations L+ = Tr′ ◦ L+, where L+ is a member of the set of LOCC operations + quantum
operations among members of the unauthorized set, and Tr′ indicates a tracing out of all parties
except one. We will also need the multipartite version of Eq. (8), L+I (τ2) = L+(ρ1I ⊗ τ2). Given
that the parties are supplied with the state ρ1I , L+I can be implemented with the same limited
communication resources as L+ can. We introduce ancilla subsystem “3”, which has the same
dimension and the same multipartite structure as subsystem “2”. Each party locally creates a
maximally entangled state Φ between its part of system 2 and 3. Let us denote the tensor product
of all these local maximally entangled states as a big maximally entangled state Φ23. Then the
parties can create the state
ωI = (L+I ⊗ I3)(Φ23). (28)
Now the proof begins by contradiction as in Section II C: suppose the qubit-hiding scheme
is not δ-secure, meaning that there are secret sharing states ϕ0 and ϕ1 and a cheating operation
L+ such that Eq. (16) is true. Then by following without change the analysis after Eq. (16), we
conclude that there must exist a bit string I for which (cf. below Eq. (21))
‖ωI=0 − ωI‖1 = ‖∆I‖1 > δ/2k+1. (29)
Unlike in the previous case, we cannot use this equation immediately to bound ǫ and end the
argument; the trace norm is only directly related to the distinguishability when any quantum
operation can be done on the state. In this case ωI is a state shared by all parties who can perform
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LOCC operations and some additional quantum communication depending on the protocol. In
other words, we can only bound the distinguishability ǫ of the classical message by (see Eq. (2))
ǫ ≥ max
I,K
DistL+(ωI , ωK) ≥ max
I,K
DistLLOCC (ωI , ωK) = max
I,K
max
LLOCC
‖LLOCC(ωI)− LLOCC(ωK)‖1.
(30)
Here DistX denotes the distinguishability of two states under the set of operationsX. We restrict
to only LOCC operations here because we can use a known relationship between the LOCC dis-
tinguishability of two states and their trace-norm distance, using the tomography arguments of
Ref. [5]. Of course, this LOCC distinguishability may be very much less than ‖ωI=0 − ωI‖1, pre-
cisely because of the data-hiding effect that is the subject of this paper, which sometimes prevents
the distinguishability of states from being detectable by LOCC operations. The effect is never
perfect, however, a fact which we now use.
Suppose the states ωI are written as [5, Eq. (105)]
ωI =
1
d
∑
J
aIJσJ , (31)
where d is the dimension of the space supporting ωI . The “3” register in Eq. (28) supports k
qubits whereas the map LI can be taken to output a single qubit [13]. Therefore, d = 2k+1. Then
Appendix B of Ref. [5, Eq. (110)] shows that
DistLOCC(ωI , ωK) ≥ 1
2
max
J
|aIJ − aKJ |. (32)
We apply a chain of inequalities:
‖ωI − ωK‖1 ≤ 1
d
∑
J
‖(aIJ − aKJ)σJ‖1 ≤ 1
d
∑
J
‖aIJ − aKJ‖1‖σJ‖1
=
∑
J
|aIJ − aKJ | ≤ d2max
J
|aIJ − aKJ |. (33)
We have used ||σJ ||1 = d. Note also that there are d2 terms in the J-sum. Combining (30), (32)
and (33):
ǫ ≥ 1
2d2
||ωI=0 − ωI ||1. (34)
So, combining this with Eq. (29), we find that
ǫ ≥ δ
4d3
=
δ
23k+5
. (35)
But since the classical hiding can be chosen such that ǫ = c12
−c2s/k, there is always a choice of
s that will guarantee that δ is as small as desired. So, at the price of a worse bound (but only
polynomially worse), we prove security of the multipartite case.
IV. HOW MANY CLASSICAL BITS ARE NEEDED IN QUANTUM HIDING
In the previous sectionswe have seen that any 2n-bit hiding scheme can be used to construct an
n-qubit hiding scheme and vice-versa. This duality has immediate implications for the resource
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requirements of quantumdata hiding schemes. In particular, suppose that {ρI} is a set of perfectly
secure hiding states for the string I , representing k bits of data and that
Eq(ϕ) =
1
2k
∑
I
ρAB1I ⊗ TI(ϕ)B2 , (36)
where TI is a TCP map and ϕ is an n-qubit state. We do not know whether all n-qubit hiding
schemes will have this form but it is a significant generalization of the construction we described
in section II. We will show that in order for this to be a secure qubit hiding scheme k ≥ 2n.
Let us assume that this provides a perfectly secure n-qubit hiding scheme for ϕ, and use the
encoding Eq to hide bits by means of our superdense coding construction. We will get a secure
2n-bit hiding scheme by applying Eq⊗ I to the appropriate maximally entangled states. We could
interpret this construction as a way of hiding a message of 2n bits by means of a key I of k
bits. We will now prove that this implies that k ≥ 2n, using an argument nearly identical to the
one Shannon used to show that one-time pad encryption of a 2n-bit message requires 2n shared
random key bits [11]. The only difference here is that we substitute quantum entropy functions
for their classical counterparts and then have to verify in a couple of places that these quantum
functions are nonnegative, a property guaranteed for their classical versions. For definitions of
the functions we use below, see, for example, Ref. [12].
Consider the density operator∑
m,I
pm|m〉〈m|M ⊗ |I〉〈I|K ⊗ ρAB1I ⊗ (TI ⊗ I)(|Φm〉〈Φm|)B2B3 . (37)
Here M is a register storing the message m, K a register storing the key I and the set {Φm}
is a set of mutually orthogonal maximally entangled states. Because the message and key are
independent, S(M : K) = 0. Likewise, because the bit-hiding scheme is perfectly secure, S(M :
B2B3) = 0. Once the key is known, however, the classical message can be reconstructed from
register B2B3 so that
S(M : B2B3|K) = S(M : K|B2B3) = S(M). (38)
Equivalently, S(K|B2B3) − S(K|B2B3M) = S(M). Because the multipartite density operator is
separable across theM/K/AB1/B2B3 cuts, S(K|B2B3M) ≥ 0, and we can conclude that S(K) ≥
S(M). In particular, applying this inequality for the uniform distribution over 2n bit messages
yields k ≥ 2n. Our conclusion is that if an n-qubit hiding scheme is constructed from a k-bit
hiding scheme in the manner of Eq. (36) then k, the number of bits, must be at least twice the
number of qubits being hidden.
These arguments can also be applied to the case of a private quantum channel. In this scenario,
the analog of an k-bit hiding scheme is just k secret random bits shared between two parties Alice
and Bob. A general private quantum channel then has the form
E(ϕ) =
1
2k
∑
I
|I, I〉〈I, I|AB ⊗ TI(ϕ)C , (39)
where TI is a general TCP map with output on the channel system C . The requirements for
the task are that, using their access to I , Bob (or Alice) can reconstruct ϕ but an eavesdropper
with access only to the channel C can learn nothing. Assume that one can encrypt an n-qubit
quantum state ϕ in this manner. Such a private quantum channel can be converted into a secure
2n-bit one-time pad using the superdense coding construction of section II B – the proof goes
through unchanged. Likewise, the resource considerations developed above imply that k ≥ 2n
bits of shared secret key are necessary and sufficient to build the n-qubit private quantum channel,
confirming the main result of Refs. [1] and [2].
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our main goal in this paper was to show how the duality between superdense coding and
teleportation can be used to construct new cryptographic protocols. From a constructive point
of view, our main results are a protocol for hiding qubits given a protocol for hiding twice as
many bits and a method for strengthening quantum secret sharing protocols such that they are
not vulnerable to cheating by LOCC.
In our analyses of imperfect hiding, however, we could only guarantee a quality of hiding
decreasing exponentially in the number of qubits, or bits, being hidden. Because the quality
typically improves exponentially with the size of the hiding state measured in qubits, our security
proofs could still be useful. Nonetheless, it seems possible that a more careful analysis of the
hiding quality of the new protocols would reveal that the exponential factor, in fact, disappears.
We leave that possibility open for future work.
Acknowledgments
We thank Dave Bacon, Debbie Leung and Andreas Winter for discussions of this work. DDV
is grateful for the support of the National Security Agency and the Advanced Research and De-
velopment Activity through Army Research Office contract number DAAD19-01-C-0056, and for
the support of the National Reconnaissance Office. BMT and PH acknowledge support from the
National Science Foundation under Grant. No. EIA-0086038. PH’s work is also supported by a
Sherman Fairchild Fellowship.
[1] P. O. Boykin and V. Roychowdhury. Optimal encryption of quantum bits. LANL e-print quant-
ph/0003059.
[2] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. de Wolf. Private quantum channels. In IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 547–553, 2000. LANL e-print quant-ph/0003101.
[3] R. Cleve, D. Gottesman, and H. K. Lo. How to share a quantum secret. Physical Review Letters,
83(3):648–651, 1999. LANL e-print quant-ph/9901025.
[4] B. M. Terhal, D.P. DiVincenzo, and D. W. Leung. Hiding bits in Bell states. Physical Review Letters,
86(25):5807–5810, 2001. LANL e-print quant-ph/0011042.
[5] D.P. DiVincenzo, D. W. Leung, and B. M. Terhal. Quantum data hiding. IEEE Transactions on Informa-
tion Theory, 48(3):580–598, 2002. LANL e-print quant-ph/0103098.
[6] T. Eggeling and R. F. Werner. Hiding classical data in multi-partite quantum states. LANL e-print
quant-ph/0203004.
[7] C. H. Bennett and S. Wiesner. Communication via one- and two-particle operators on Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen states. Physical Review Letters, 69(20):2881–2884, 1992.
[8] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Cre´peau, R. Jozsa, A. Peres, and W. K. Wootters. Teleporting an un-
known quantum state via dual classical and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen channels. Physical Review Let-
ters, 70:1895–1899, 1993.
[9] D. Gottesman. Theory of quantum secret sharing. Physical Review A, 61(4):042311, 2000. LANL e-print
quant-ph/9910067.
[10] J. Jamiołkowski. Linear transformations which preserve trace and positive semidefiniteness of opera-
tors. Reports on Mathematical Physics, 3(4):275–278, 1972.
[11] C. E. Shannon. Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell System Technical Journal, 28:656–715,
1949.
[12] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang. Quantum computation and quantum information. Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
14
[13] The quantum operation with single-bit outcome corresponding to projection onto the positive and
negative subspaces of τ0 − τ1 for any density operators τi will have trace norm distance between the
outcomes exactly equal to ‖τ0 − τ1‖1.
